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Double Blind Comparisons using Groups with Infeasible Inversion 
Abstract. Double Blind Comparison is a new cryptographic primitive that allows a user who is in possession 
of a ciphertext to determine if the corresponding plaintext is identical to the plaintext for a different 
ciphertext held by a different user, but only if both users co-operate. Neither user knows anything about the 
plaintexts corresponding to either ciphertext, and neither user learns anything about the plaintexts as a result 
of the comparison, other than whether the two plaintexts are identical. Neither user can determine whether 
the plaintexts are equal without the other user’s co-operation. 
Double Blind Comparisons have potential application in Anonymous Credentials and the Database 
Aggregation Problem. 
This paper shows how Double Blind Comparisons can be implemented using a Strong Associative One-Way 
Function (SAOWF). Proof of security is given, making an additional assumption that the SAOWF is 
implemented on a Group with Infeasible Inversion (GII), whose existence was postulated by Hohenberger 
and Molnar. 
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1   Double Blind Comparison 
Double Blind Comparison is a new cryptographic primitive that allows a user who is in possession 
of a ciphertext to determine if the corresponding plaintext is identical to the plaintext for a different 
ciphertext held by a different user, but only if both users co-operate. Neither user knows anything 
about the plaintexts corresponding to either ciphertext, and neither user learns anything about the 
plaintexts as a result of the comparison, other than whether the two plaintexts are identical.  
Double Blind Comparison differs from Secure Multi-Party Computation [33]. With Secure Multi-
Party Computation, the users each know their own secret and compute some function of the combined 
secrets, without revealing any information about their own secrets to the other parties; whereas with 
Double Blind Comparison, the users do not know the secret messages they are comparing.  
This is an important distinction, as it allows two users to determine whether or not their two secrets 
are equal. If the secret is known to one of the users, then the knowledge that the two secrets are equal 
immediately reveals the value of the other user’s secret. This rules out Secure Multi-Party 
Computation as a solution.  
This paper shows how Double Blind Comparisons can be implemented using a Strong Associative 
One-Way Function (SAOWF). Proof of security is given, making an additional assumption that the 
SAOWF is implemented on a Group with Infeasible Inversion (GII), whose existence was first 
postulated jointly by Hohenberger [17] and Molnar [22]. 
2   Preliminaries  
2.1   Terminology 
Following Homan [18], we use the phrase “2-ary function” to mean “two argument function” and 
the phrase “1-ary function” to mean “one-argument function.” 
For any 2-ary function  , we will use prefix and infix notation interchangeably; i.e.  (   )     . 
Where the meaning is clear, we will omit the function symbol   entirely. 
A function         is total if it is defined over every element in its domain; i.e. if       
   (   )   . Unless explicitly stated as being partial, all 2-ary functions in this paper are total over 
* × *. 
A 2-ary function         is associative if           (   )     (   ).  
A 2-ary function         is one-way if, given      it is infeasible to find       such that 
 (   )   . Saxena and Soh [31] call this property weakly one-way. 
A 2-ary function         is strong if (i) given        it is infeasible to find     such that 
 (   )   , and (ii) given        it is infeasible to find     such that  (   )   . Saxena and 
Soh [31] call this property strongly one-way. 
An Associative One-Way Function (AOWF) is a 2-ary function   that is associative and one-way. 
A SAOWF is a 2-ary function   that is strong and associative. 
Early papers ([28][29]) assumed that a strong function was necessarily one-way. In 2000, however, 
Hemaspaandra, Pasanen, and Rothe [14] showed that if      , strongness does not imply one-
wayness, and vice-versa: one-wayness does not imply strongness.  
In this paper, we state explicitly that the function in question is Strong, Total, and Associative, but 
not necessarily One-way.  
2.2   Perfect Indistinguishability 
We follow the terminology of Damgard and Nielsen [9].  
Consider a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm  . If we run   on input string  , the 
output will be a probability distribution: for every possible string   there some probability that   is 
output when   was the input. We call this probability   ( ).    is the probability distribution of  ’s 
output, on input  .  
Next, consider two probabilistic algorithms    . We run both   and   on the same input  , and we 
choose one of the outputs produced, which we call  .  
Definition: Given two PPT algorithms    , we say that     are perfectly indistinguishable, 
written      , if       for every  . 
3   Related work 
3.1   Secure Multi-Party Computation 
Secure multi-party computation was initially suggested by A. C. Yao in a 1982 paper [33], in which 
he introduced the millionaire problem: Alice and Bob are two millionaires who want to find out who 
is richer without either revealing to the other the precise amount of their wealth. Yao proposed a 
solution allowing Alice and Bob to satisfy their curiosity while respecting the constraints. In general, 
Secure Multi-Party Computation allows   users, each of whom has a secret   , to compute some 
function  (*  +   
 ), without allowing user    to learn the value    for any      . 
Because each user    knows his or her own secret   , one problem that cannot be solved with 
secure multi-party computation is whether       for any     , as this would immediately reveal the 
value of    to user   .  
With Double Blind Comparisons, neither of the users knows the value of the secret they are 
comparing, and thus the question of equality can be resolved without compromising the secret. 
3.2   Associative One-way Functions and Groups with Infeasible Inversion 
Rabi and Sherman first proposed the idea of Associative One-Way Functions (AOWF) and 
SAOWF [28] [29]. These papers showed how AOWF and SAOWF could be used for secret key 
agreement and digital signatures. In [28], the question of whether such functions existed was an open 
problem. In [29], Rabi and Sherman published their results formally and proved that AOWFs exist if 
and only if      , leaving the question of whether SAOWFs exist as an open problem.  
Beygelzimer, Hemaspaandra, Homan and Rothe [1] presented a survey of work on AOWFs up to 
1999. 
Hemaspaandra and Rothe [15] proved that Strong Total Commutative Associative One-way 
Functions exist if and only if      . Hemaspaandra and Rothe states without proof, and 
incorrectly, that strongness implies one-wayness. However, Hemaspaandra, Pasanen, and Rothe [14] 
subsequently showed that if      , strongness does not imply one-wayness, and vice-versa: one-
wayness does not imply strongness. Even though  (   ) is one-way, knowledge of   (resp.  ) 
provides additional information that may make it easier to recover   (resp.  ); conversely, even 
though  (   ) is strong, this does not preclude the possibility of finding a pair      , where 
       , such that  (   )   . 
Subsequent to this, Hemaspaandra, Rothe and Saxena [16] considered the four properties: Strong, 
Total, Commutative, Associative; and for each property, considered three cases: True, Not True, and 
“Don’t Care”. This resulted in 34 = 81 possible cases. Hemaspaandra, Rothe and Saxena showed that 
if standard one-way functions exist, then 2-ary one-way functions exist for each of those 81 cases.  
Homan [18] proved that: 
 if standard, unambiguous, one-way functions exist, then there exist strong, total, 
associative, one-way functions that are O(n)-to-one; 
 there exists an (nO(1))-to-one, strong, total AOWF if and only if P ≠ FewP, where FewP is 
the class of languages in NP that are accepted by machines with a polynomial-bounded 
number of accepting paths on each input;  
 no O(1)-to-one total, associative functions exist in  ×  → ; and  
 for every nondecreasing, unbounded, total, recursive function g: N → N, there is a g(n)-to-
one, total, commutative, associative, recursive function in  ×  → .  
Hohenberger [17] and Molnar [22] studied the importance of imposing group structure on one-way 
functions. They jointly define a Group with Infeasible Inversion (GII) to be a standard group   with 
the additional property that     , finding     is difficult, and show that  
i) a SAOWF over a group forms a GII; and  
ii) the group operator of any GII is a SAOWF. 
Lemma 1 [17][22]:  A SAOWF         over a group   forms a GII. 
Proof: All the standard group properties are satisfied by assumption, so it only remains to show that 
    , finding     is difficult.  
Suppose conversely there is a PPT algorithm   that, given    , finds     with non-negligible 
probability. Then there exists a PPT algorithm    that, given      , finds     such that     , 
as follows:    calls   with input   and receives output     with non-negligible probability.    
computes       ; then     (    )   , which violates the assumption that   is strong. 
 
Lemma 2 [17][22]: If   is a GII with group function        , then   is a SAOWF. 
Proof: Associativity holds because   is a group. It only remains to show that (i) given      , 
finding     such that      is difficult, and (ii) given      , finding     such that      is 
difficult. 
(i) Suppose conversely that there is a PPT algorithm   that, given      , finds     such 
that      with non-negligible probability. Then we construct a PPT algorithm    that, 
given any    , finds     with non-negligible probability, as follows: 
  , given any    , selects      and calls   with input     . With non-negligible 
probability,   returns   such that      . It follows that      , violating the 
assumption that   is a GII. 
(ii) Follows similarly. 
 
The question of whether GIIs exist remains open. Saxena and Soh [31] defined a SAOWF to be an 
abelian group (   ) with a Strong Associative group function; and noted that this definition of 
SAOWF is equivalent to a GII. Saxena and Soh used the term “strongly one-way” to mean “strong”, 
and “weakly one-way” to mean “one-way”, as we have defined the terms here, and proposed a 
candidate function, which they claim is strong, that relies on a black-box oracle to compute the 
function; the oracle takes as input (   ) and produces a single output  (   ). Saxena and Soh 
referred to this as an Oracle Strong Associative One-Way Function (O-SAOWF). 
Zucker [34] proposed a commutative SAOWF with identity, based on knot theory (specifically 
braid closures), but this has not been analyzed further. 
4   Double Blind Comparisons 
4.1   Overview 
In discussing this system, we consider the following parties: a Submitter (Alice), who initiates a 
comparison; a Comparer (Bob), who carries out the comparison; and a Trusted Central Authority 
(Ted). 
Note: In this paper, we distinguish between a Submitter and a Comparer. The Submitter uses Left-
encrypted entries, which we define to be entries of the form *        +, while the Comparer uses 
Right-encrypted entries, which we define to be entries of the form *        +. A Double Blind 
comparison can only be carried out between a Submitter and a Comparer.  
If   is abelian, then this distinction is moot. None of the proofs of security require   to be either 
abelian or non-abelian. 
We assume throughout that Alice is the Submitter and Bob is the Comparer unless otherwise noted. 
The subscripts   and   will be omitted where it is clear from the context which is the Submitter and 
which is the Comparer. 
4.2   Set-up  
Let   be a GII with group operator        . In the following, we omit explicit mention of the 
operator  . Alice is the Submitter, Bob is the Comparer, and Ted is a semi-trusted third party.  
Let  be a message known only to Ted.  
Let       be Alice’s and Bob’s private keys respectively.     are chosen randomly and kept 
secret by Alice and Bob respectively. 
Alice chooses       and sends     to Ted. 
Ted chooses       and computes and sends *        + to Alice. The use of    guards against 
the possibility that Alice knows an inverse for    and has chosen it in an attempt to recover the value 
 . 
Alice chooses       and computes          . She stores     *   (     )  +  *     +. 
The use of    prevents Ted from associating    with . 
Similarly, Bob computes and stores     *(     )     +  *     +, where          is 
similarly constructed between Bob and Ted. 
4.3   Double Blind Comparison 
Define      , where    *(    )  + and     *(    )  +, if      ; i.e. if both    and 
   are encryptions of the same message . 
To determine whether      , Alice chooses a random number   and sends Bob * (    )    +.  
Bob calculates: 
   (     )(  ) 
   (   )(    ) 
Bob accepts that       iff       . 
4.3.1   Submitter/Comparer 
If   is abelian, any Submitter certificate is also a Comparer certificate. 
If   is non-abelian, it is still possible for one person to play the role of either Submitter or 
Comparer by requesting both a Left-encrypted ciphertext and a Right-encrypted ciphertext of the 
same message .  
Unless otherwise specified, we assume that a person is either a Submitter or a Comparer.  
4.3.2   Comparisons Initiated by Comparer 
The terminology of Submitter/Comparer implies that a request for a comparison is submitted by the 
Submitter and answered by the Comparer. By symmetry, the operation could be reversed – there is no 
reason why a Comparer could not initiate the request and the Submitter perform the comparison. 
However, in this paper we will assume that only Submitters initiate requests. 
4.3.3   Multiple Trusted Central Authorities who are not mutually trusted 
It is not necessary for all the encrypted secrets to be issued by the same central authority.  
For example, suppose Carol is a CIA agent who is issued a CIA Submitter certificate by Ted, while 
Konstantin is a KGB handler who is issued a KGB Comparer certificate by Tomasz. Nothing in the 
protocol precludes this; the expected result would be that, when comparing secrets, Carol and 
Konstantin discover only that their respective secrets are not equal. 
5   Security 
We prove the following: 
1. False positives: suppose Carol is issued a token    by Ted, while Viktor is issued a token    by 
Tomasz. Clearly, it would be undesirable to discover that      . We show the possibility of 
Ted and Tomasz issuing tokens which happen to be equivalent to be negligible. 
2. False negatives: if Alice is issued     and Bob is issued    by Ted, where       , we show 
the probability of Bob mistakenly rejecting Alice also to be negligible. 
3. Unrecoverability: No one who has access to    is able to recover the secret value . 
4. Unlinkability (1): Ted, knowing a value  and given a ciphertext   , but lacking knowledge of 
 , has no advantage in determining whether  is the plaintext corresponding to   . 
5. Unlinkability (2): No one, given     and   , is able to determine whether       without 
knowledge of both   and  .  
5.1   False positives  
False positives: suppose Carol is issued a token    by Ted, while Viktor is issued a token    by 
Tomasz. The probability that       is negligible. 
Proof: Suppose Carol is issued a token     *     + by Ted, while Viktor is issued a token 
    *     + by Tomasz. Suppose further that, when Carol initiates a DBC protocol exchange to 
Viktor, Viktor accepts that      . 
Then it must be the case that Carol has chosen a random element      and sent *        + to 
Viktor, and it must also be the case that    (    )(  )  (   )(   )    , from which we can 
conclude that    (since   is a group). 
Thus, in order for a false positive to occur, both Ted and Tomasz must have randomly chosen the 
same element of   for the hidden message. The possibility of this happening is 
 
   
, which is 
negligible. 
 
5.2   False negatives  
False negatives: if Ted issues    to Alice and    to Bob, where       , then the probability that 
Bob mistakenly rejects Alice is negligible. 
Proof: Suppose       , where    *(    )  + and     *(    )  +. Then by definition, 
     . 
    ,    (     )(  )  (     )(  )  (   )(    )     
In which case, Bob accepts Alice.  
 
5.3   Unrecoverability  
There are two cases of interest. In the first place, an attacker (Alice) tries to recover the value of   
without any knowledge of the value of  . In the second, an attacker (Ted) who knows all possible 
values of  , tries to tries to recover the value of  from a particular encrypted instance. 
 
Case A1: Given        (  )  *(    )  +, Alice cannot find any  
  such that   (  )  
*(    )  +. 
Proof: Follows from the fact that the function is strong. 
 
Case T1: Given   ,   (  )  *(     )   +, Ted cannot find any  
  such that   (  )  
*(      )   +,  
Proof: Follows from the fact that the function is strong. 
 
5.4   Unlinkability (1) 
Case T2: Ted knows two secrets,    and   , and is given   (  )  *(     )   +, where   *   +, 
but does not know Alice’s secret key  ; Ted tries to determine  . 
Formalize this as: Given   ,   , and   (  )  *(     )   +, where   *   +; let T be any PPT 
algorithm that outputs a guess for  . Then:  
Pr(T(        (  ))   *   +    ) = Pr(T(        (  ))   *   +      )  
 
Proof: For any input        (  )  *      +, there exists  
  such that   (  )  *( 
      )  + 
Let            
     .  
Then         (        
     )(     )        
Then:  
Pr(T guesses correctly) 
= Pr(T(        (  ))   *   +    ) 
= Pr(T(      *          +)   *   +    ) 
= Pr(T(      * 
        +)   *   +    ) 
= Pr(T guesses incorrectly) 
Since the output of T is independent of the value of , the probability that T guesses correctly 
equals the probability that T guesses incorrectly; therefore,  
Pr(T(        (  ))   *   +    ) = Pr(T(        (  ))   *   +      ) 
 
Case T3: Ted knows one secret,   , where   *   +, and is given   (  )  *(     )   +, and 
  (  )  *(     )   +; Ted tries to determine  . 
Formalize this as: Given   (  )  *(     )   +   (  )  *(     )   +, and   , where 
  *   +; let T be any PPT algorithm that outputs a guess for  . Then:  
Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   )   *   +    ) = Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   )   *   +      ) 
Proof:  
WLOG suppose    . 
For any        (  )  *        + and        (  )  *        +, 
there exist      , such that  
i)         
    
 ; and 
ii)         
      
as follows: 
Let            
    
  . Then        (       
    
  )(    )        
Let     
  (  )       . Then  
    
  (    )(  
  (  )       )        
Let    
       . 
Then Pr(T guesses correctly)  
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   )   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(*        + *        +   )   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(*     
    } * 
        +   )   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(*         } * 
        +   )   *   +    )  
= Pr(T guesses incorrectly). 
Since the output of T is independent of the value of  , the probability that T guesses correctly 
equals the probability that T guesses incorrectly; therefore,  
Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   )   *   +    ) = Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   )   *   +      ) 
 
5.5   Unlinkability (2) 
Given two encrypted values,   ( )  *     + and   ( )   *     +, no process can determine 
whether    without knowledge of both   and  . 
Formally, given any PPT algorithm T with input   (  )  *        +,   (  )  *        + 
and   (  )  *        +, where   *   +, and output   *   +, 
Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  ))   *   +    ) 
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  ))   *   +      ) 
We analyze the following attacks: 
Case A2: Alice knows   (  )  *        +,   (  )  *        +,   (  )  *        +, where 
  *   +, and her own secret key  . Alice succeeds if, without Bob’s co-operation, she has an 
advantage in determining  . 
Formalize this as: Given     (  )  *(     )   +   (  )  *(     )   +, and   (  )  
*        +, where   *   +; let T be any PPT algorithm that outputs a guess for  . Then:  
Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  )  )   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  )  )   *   +      ) 
Proof: 
WLOG suppose    . 
For any        (  )         (  ), and   (  ) there exists  
  such that         
 : 
Let    (   )(  
  )(    ) 
Let                        
Then   (  )    (  )  *        +,   (  )    (  )  *        +, and   (  )     (  )  
*    
   +,  
Since the output of T is independent of  ,  
Pr(T guesses correctly)  
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  ))   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )    (  ))   *   +    )  
= Pr(T guesses incorrectly). 
 
Case A3: Alice knows   (  )   (  ),   (  ), where   *   +, and her own secret key  . Alice 
succeeds if, without Bob’s co-operation, she has an advantage in determining  . 
Proof: Follows automatically from case B1, below. 
 
Case B1: Bob knows   (  ),   (  ), and his own secret key  . He receives a query from Alice, 
*           +, and determines that this corresponds to   (  )  *        +, where   *   +. Bob 
succeeds if, without Alice’s co-operation, he has an advantage in determining  . 
Formalize this as: Given   (  )   (  ), +,   (  ), where   *   +, and  ; let T be any PPT 
algorithm that outputs a guess for  . Then:  
Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  )  )   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  )  )   *   +      ) 
Proof: 
WLOG suppose    . 
For any        (  )         (  ), and   (  ), there exist   
     such that: 
i)      
       ; 
ii)              
Let    (     )  
    
   
Let     
    
  
(     ) 
Let    
                   . 
Then   (  )  *        +  { 
        }     (  ) 
And   (  )  *        +  { 
        }     (  ). 
 
Since the output of T is independent of  ,  
Pr(T guesses correctly)  
= Pr(T(  (  )   (  )   (  ))   *   +    )  
= Pr(T(   (  )    (  )   (  ))   *   +    )  
= Pr(T guesses incorrectly). 
 
6   Applications of Double Blind Comparison 
This paper identifies two potential applications of Double Blind Comparison – as a possible new 
approach to the Database aggregation and inference problem, and as a possible new form of 
Anonymous Credential. 
These applications will form the subject of a future paper. 
6.1   Database aggregation and inference problem 
NCSC Technical Report 005, Volume 1/5 [24] defines the inference problem as the problem “of 
users deducing (or inferring) higher level information based upon lower, visible data”, and the 
aggregation problem as the problem that occurs “when classifying and protecting collections of data 
that have a higher security level than any of the elements that comprise the aggregate”. 
Denning et al. [11] identified two different types of aggregation, which White, Fisch and Pooch 
[32] refers to as cardinal aggregation and inference aggregation. 
Cardinal aggregation occurs when an adversary collects a large number of similar records, each of 
which by itself is of little importance, but which by sheer volume become sensitive. An example of 
this used in the literature (e.g. [24]) is the CIA telephone directory, where each individual entry is of 
little significance, but the entire directory is considered classified. 
Inference aggregation occurs when multiple databases are joined, creating virtual records with a 
large number of fields. While the sensitivity of the individual records may have been analyzed and 
found to be low, the sensitivity of the resulting virtual records has likely never been analyzed, and 
may be quite high.  
Consider the following two databases: a military personnel database, containing two fields - a 
military Service Number (SN) and a job classification – and a military medical database, containing 
the employee SN and a medical status.  
Neither of these databases appears to contain information of operational value, and both may be 
accorded less protection as a result. However, consider the records for the member with SN C55-111-
555. The personnel database shows this person to be a CF-18 Fighter Pilot. The medical database 
shows this person to be 4 months pregnant.  
Neither of these facts, in isolation, provides any information about the operational effectiveness of 
the person’s military unit. When combined, however, they allow an adversary to infer that there is a 
CF-18 fighter pilot who is currently unavailable to fly combat missions – information that might be of 
operational significance. 
Database inference may be made more difficult by increasing the difficulty of aggregation. For 
example, a government database may identify individuals by a Social Insurance Number, a bank by a 
customer ID number, and a business by an employee ID. Records from one database cannot then 
easily be linked to records from another. However, there are many cases where it is necessary to 
match a record from one database to its corresponding record in another.  
Double Blind Comparisons allow us to distribute a large dataset among multiple databases, while 
retaining the ability to match and compare records across two or more of these databases. For 
example, an employee’s personnel records can be matched to her medical profile, but only if the 
administrators for the personnel and medical databases co-operate. Because the records cannot be 
linked otherwise, the security requirements on the two databases can be made much less stringent. 
Even a complete compromise of both databases would not yield any useable aggregation of data.  
6.2   Anonymous Credentials 
An electronic credential is issued to a user by one organization (the issuer) that enables the user to 
demonstrate to a third party (the Comparer) that the user possesses some attribute. With anonymous 
credentials [4][5][6][7], a user is able to obtain a credential from an issuing organization (possibly 
using a pseudonym) and use that credential to prove possession of some attribute to multiple 
Comparers, using different pseudonyms, in such a way that the issuer of the credential and the 
Comparers would be unable to link the transactions. 
Double Blind Comparisons might enable one organization (Alice) to prove to another organization 
(Bob) that a user (Carol) possesses some attribute or attributes (e.g. a Secret security clearance and a 
cryptographic public key) without revealing any more information to either Alice or Bob than is 
strictly necessary.  
7   Conclusions 
This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive, Double Blind Comparisons, which allows 
two co-operating users, each of whom is in possession of an encrypted message, to compare those 
messages for equality or non-equality of the underlying plaintexts, even though neither user knows the 
plaintext messages. It presents a method of achieving this primitive using SAOWFs, which are known 
to exist if      . A proof of security is provided, which requires the additional assumption that the 
SAOWF is over a group; the group properties are required for this proof of security, but not for the 
implementation of the primitive. Two potential applications, in which Double Blind Comparisons 
may prove useful, are identified. 
7.1   Open problems  
7.1.1   Splitting of Credentials 
As it stands, a Submitter (Alice) can easily “split” her Submitter certificate into multiple copies and 
share them with her friends, as follows: 
Alice’s certificate is    *(    )  +. She wants to create a new certificate to give to her friend 
Carol. Alice chooses two random elements       ; she sets     and      , and computes 
   *  (    )    +  *      +. She sends Carol *    +.  
Carol can use the newly formed pair *    + directly to authenticate to any Comparer certificate    
where      . Alternatively, she can repeat the process to come up with a new pair, *    +, in which 
case even Alice will no longer know Carol’s secret key.  
In general, the ability to split an anonymous credential is considered a highly undesirable feature. 
Preventing the splitting of anonymous credentials is an area of ongoing research. A number of 
techniques have been proposed to prevent, discourage, or limit the splitting of anonymous credentials, 
including PKI-assured [6][12][13][21], “All-or-nothing” [5], Biometric-based [3][19][25][26][27], 
and Credential Modification [2][8]. An analysis of these techniques to determine whether they can be 
applied to DBC-based anonymous credentials will be the subject of further research. 
7.1.2   Unlinkability (1) 
Under Unlinkability (1), we considered two cases for Ted: one in which Ted knows   and  , and is 
given   (  ), where   *   +, and another in which Ted knows   , and is given   (  )   (  ). 
The observant reader will have noticed that we did not address the case in which Ted knows    and 
  , and is given   (  )   (    ). 
Indeed, the proof technique given in the text breaks down in this event and we were unable to prove 
the protocol secure against this attack. However, we were also unable to identify any attacks which 
might be used to exploit this situation, and we conjecture that the protocol is secure against this attack 
as well. 
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